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SEARCHING FOR AN IMPARTIAL SENTENCER
THROUGH JURY SELECTION IN
CAPITAL TRIALS
Marshall Dayan, * Robert Steven Mahler**
and M, Gordon Widenhouse, Jr. ***
Jury selection is perhaps the most important stage of any trial' and
is especially important in capital trials where a jury recommends the sen-
tence.2 Capital trials routinely involve very brutal crimes where the de-
fendant's guilt is virtually unassailable.3 In these cases, the only serious
undertaking for a jury is the determination of the appropriate sentence-
life or death. The criminal justice system assumes that a jury which is
impartial regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused can at the same
time be biased as to the appropriate punishment for one convicted of
murder. In light of overwhelming societal support for the death pen-
alty,4 the task of empaneling an impartial jury to determine the appropri-
ate punishment for a person convicted of murder may be difficult, if not
impossible. Nevertheless, defense lawyers must select qualified and com-
petent jurors who are willing to sentence their clients to death,' and voir
dire is the tool provided for accomplishing this goal.
This article offers several methods for selecting an impartial sentenc-
ing jury in a capital murder trial. Section I of the article briefly outlines
* Staff Attorney, North Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center; B.A., University of
Georgia; J.D., Antioch University.
** Director, North Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center; B.G.S., University of Mich-
igan; J.D., University of North Carolina.
*** Assistant Appellate Defender, State of North Carolina; B.A., Davidson College; J.D.,
Wake Forest University.
1. Voir dire "plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored." Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV.
331, 341 (1979).
3. Id. at 345. This is not to suggest that even when there is little doubt that the defendant
"did it," no legal questions exist regarding gradations of culpability that aggressive counsel
must explore.
4. Death Penalty Support Hits Record Hfgh, Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer, Dec. 4,
1988, at 23A, col. 1.
5. Jurors must be at least willing to consider invoking the death penalti if they are to
determine a sentence which may potentially be death. See discussion of Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), infra notes 102-13 and 258-62 and accompanying text.
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the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury in state criminal proceed-
ings, the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the role of the sentencer in a capital trial, and the constitutional
doctrines arising from the sixth and eighth amendments and their special
concern with the irrevocability of death as a punishment. Section II
posits that jurors who harbor misconceptions about the parole eligibility
of life-sentenced inmates are not eligible to pass sentence, and proposes
that voir dire is a constitutionally mandated method to assure that the
empaneled jury is impartial. Section III contends that jurors who are not
able to give independent weight to relevant mitigating evidence offered
by the defendant facing death are not eligible to pass sentence, and pro-
poses that voir dire is a constitutionally mandated method to assure that
the empaneled jury is impartial. Section IV briefly elucidates the consti-
tutional implications of peremptory challenges, and suggests that a pros-
ecutor's use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude all jurors
who express any misgivings about the imposition of the death penalty
creates a biased jury. Section V concludes by reiterating the importance
of jury selection in capital cases and urging that the empaneling of an
impartial jury at a capital sentencing hearing is important as a matter of
trial strategy within the adversary system and necessary as a matter of
constitutional law.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. ."I Sixth amendment
protections are extended to state criminal prosecutions through the four-
teenth amendment's Due Process Clause.' Indeed, even before the guar-
antees of the sixth amendment were incorporated to govern state
prosecutions, the Due Process Clause was held to require an impartial
jury in a state criminal prosecution.8
Without doubt, no federal or state jurisdiction purports to allow the
use of voir dire as a tool to select a jury more favorable to one side or the
other. Rather, consistent with an adversary system of justice, the ration-
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
8. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 772 (1961). Voir dire, which is primarily governed by
state law, is used to enforce the federal constitutional right to an impartial jury. Turner v.
Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973).
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ale for voir dire in most jurisdictions is two-fold: first and foremost, to
obtain a petit jury which is impartial, able to apply the law fairly and to
consider the evidence before it objectively and, second, to allow the par-
ties to exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently. 9 When em-
ployed as a tool for the protection of the constitutional right to an
impartial jury, the specific issue of whether to allow a particular question
or line of questions is left to the discretion of the trial court.10 Neverthe-
less, the United States Supreme Court has limited this discretion by hold-
ing that the sixth amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment, require a trial court to conduct voir dire on spe-
cific areas of prejudice when special circumstances attending a particular
trial raise a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent such ques-
tioning, the jury empaneled would not be impartial."
This jurisprudence has developed both slowly and indirectly. The
tentative examination of these specific areas of prejudice by the federal
courts is, no doubt, rooted in traditional concerns about comity with the
states. Nevertheless, this requirement is important to counsel's approach
in seeking to impanel an impartial jury to pass sentence in a capital trial.
For the most part, the Court has addressed a defendant's constitu-
tional right to question the bias of prospective jurors in the context of
interracial crimes. In Ham v. South Carolina,12 the United States
Supreme Court addressed a claim that petitioner was denied the right to
a fair and impartial jury under the sixth and fourteenth amendments
when the trial court denied the request of petitioner's counsel to ask four
specific questions addressing the bias of prospective jurors. 3 Two ques-
tions involved racial bias, a third involved bias against beards, and the
fourth involved bias in favor of a police officer/witness who had made a
television appearance shortly before the trial discussing drug problems.14
The petitioner, Gene Ham, was a young, black civil rights worker
charged with possession of marijuana. 5 He was well known locally for
9. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981). See also State v. Bracey,
303 N.C. 112, 119, 277 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1981).
10. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973). There are important justifications
for leaving the trial court with this discretion. For example, one of the critical determinations
on the question of impartiality is the demeanor of the prospective juror, which can only be seen
in the trial court. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1985); Patton v. Yount, 467
U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 (1984).
11. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 (1976).
12. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
13. Id. at 525-26.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 524-25.
154 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:151
his civil rights work. 6 Ham claimed that he had been "framed" on the
drug charge because the local police were "out to get him."17 Ham's
trial counsel requested the four voir dire questions respecting bias based
on race, beards, and pre-trial publicity, but the trial court refused to
make any of the requested inquiries.II Gene Ham was found guilty, and
his conviction was affirmed by a divided South Carolina Supreme
Court.19 Relying on Aldridge v. United States,2" the dissenting justices of
the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the federal Constitution
mandated the requested inquiries as to racial prejudice.
Ham appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which initially
implied thatAldridge, a case involving a federal rather than a state prose-
cution, did not necessarily apply to the states.21 However, the Court
agreed with the dissenting Justices of the South Carolina Supreme Court
that in this case, the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment
required the trial judge to conduct voir dire on the question of racial
prejudice.22 In so holding, the Court reasoned that the decision in Al-
dridge was founded on "the essential demands of fairness," impliedly in-
voking the Due Process Clause. 3 Additionally, the Court noted that
since the fourteenth amendment was principally adopted to cure invidi-
ous racial discrimination, the constitutional imperative of an impartial
jury required voir dire on the question of racial discrimination when ra-
cial considerations were central to the defense.24 While acknowledging a
constitutional mandate, the Court did not require a particular form or
number of questions and left the process of voir dire to the discretion of
the trial court.
The Court's reasoning did not support requiring voir dire regarding
bias against beards.2 While the Court could not say "that prejudice
against people with beards might not have been harbored by one or more
of the potential jurors in this case," it acknowledged its inability to dis-
tinguish constitutionally possible prejudice against beards from a host of
other potential similar prejudices.26 In contrast, the racial prejudice in-
quiry was founded in the Constitution and common law and created a
16. Id. at 525.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 526.
19. Id. at 524-25.
20. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
21. Ham, 409 U.S. at 526-27.
22. Id. at 527.
23. Id. at 526-27.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 527-28.
26. Id.
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constitutional distinction from other forms of prejudice.27 Finally, the
Court held that the record did not support the claim that pre-trial public-
ity biased the jury in this case.28
Just over three years later, the Court limited the scope of its decision
in Ham in the non-capital case of Ristaino v. Ross.2 9 Ross, a black man,
was one of several persons charged with armed robbery, assault and bat-
tery with a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent to
murder a white security guard employed by Boston University.30 The
case was tried in Boston and trial counsel for the defendants suggested
that the interracial nature of the crime required voir dire on the issue of
racial prejudice.31 Counsel indicated no special circumstances other than
the interracial nature of the crime.32 After inviting counsel to inform the
court of any special circumstances that would militate in favor of con-
ducting voir dire on racial prejudice,33 the trial court declined to conduct
voir dire on racial prejudice. The trial court asked prospective jurors to
inform the court of any biases or prejudices they held.34 Eighteen poten-
tial jurors were excused for cause, one on the grounds of racial preju-
dice.3 On appeal, Ross preserved his sixth and fourteenth amendment
claim that the denial of voir dire on racial prejudice denied him a fair and
impartial jury.3 6 This contention was rejected by the state courts.
37
Ross then sought a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court.38 While Ross' petition was pending, Ham was decided.
Ross' petition was granted, and the lower court's judgment was vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Ham.39 After the judgment
was re-affirmed,4 ° Ross sought post-conviction relief in federal court.41
The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, holding that Ross
27. Id. at 528.
28. Id.
29. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
30. Id. at 590.
31. Id. at 590-91.
32. Id. at 591.
33. Id. at 591-92.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Id. at 593.
36. Id. at 593-94.
37. Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1972), vacated sub noma. Ross
v. Massachusetts, 410 U.S. 901, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973).
38. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F. Supp. 99, 100 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
39. Ross v. Massachusetts, 410 U.S. 901 (1973).
40. Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973).
41. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1974).
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was denied a fair and impartial jury under Ham.4 2 The First Circuit
affirmed.43
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, observing that
the First Circuit "read Ham too broadly."'  The Court asserted that
"[t]he Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to have questions
posed during voir dire specifically directed to matters that conceivably
might prejudice veniremen against him."45
While negating any suggestion that Ham required voir dire on racial
prejudice whenever a trial involves a crime of interracial violence, the
Court also concluded that voir dire on racial bias will be required when
"there [is] a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent question-
ing about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be as indifferent as they
stand unsworne."' 4 1 Whether voir dire questions specifically directed to
racial prejudice are constitutionally required is assessed by considering
all the circumstances surrounding the trial, including whether racial fac-
tors exist as in Ham.4 7
The Ham/Ristaino rule, requiring special circumstances to entitle a
defendant to specific questions on voir dire, was applied in the capital
context ten years later in Turner v. Murray." Willie Turner, a black
man, was charged with the murder of a white storekeeper.49 At his trial,
Turner's counsel submitted to the court a list of proposed voir dire ques-
tions.5 ° One proposed question addressed whether Turner being black
and his victim being white would prejudice prospective jurors against
Turner or would affect their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict
based solely on the evidence.-" The trial court declined to ask the mem-
bers of the venire this question. 2
Turner was convicted, sentenced to death, and subsequently ap-
pealed his conviction and sentence to the state supreme court, claiming,
inter alia, a denial of his sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial
jury because the trial court refused to ask prospective jurors whether the
interracial nature of the crime affected their judgment. 3 Turner's con-
42. Id. at 100.
43. Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1974).
44. Ross, 424 U.S. at 594.
45. Id. (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 596.
47. Id. at 597.
48. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
49. Id. at 29.
50. Id. at 30.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 31.
53. Id.
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viction was affirmed based on Ristaino.4
Turner sought collateral relief through issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus in the federal courts, again raising a sixth amendment violation
based on denial of voir dire on racial prejudice." Both the United States
District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected the claim.5 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
for the issuance of the writ insofar as Turner's death sentence was con-
cerned.17 The Court acknowledged the Fourth Circuit's correct reliance
on the test articulated in Ristaino to decide whether particular inquiries
on voir dire were required." The Court distinguished Ristaino, however,
noting that it was not a death penalty case.59 The Court stated that "the
[sentencing] jury [in a capital case] is called upon to make a 'highly sub-
jective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a
particular person deserves.' "60 The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause of
the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing,
there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain
undetected."61 The Court stated that given the finality of the death pen-
alty, the risk that racial prejudice infected the capital sentencing proceed-
ing is unacceptable when weighed against the ease with which that risk
could be minimized.6" Therefore, a plurality held "that a capital defend-
ant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors
informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial
bias."63 This holding reached the death sentence because of the breadth
of discretion afforded a sentencing jury under Virginia's capital-sentenc-
ing scheme. However, the holding did not affect Turner's conviction."4
Hence, Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result insofar as
it affected Turner's sentence; they dissented from the plurality's decision
insofar as it affirmed Turner's conviction.65 Turner represents the
54. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S.E.2d 36 (1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Turner v. Virginia, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
55. Turner, 476 U.S. at 32-33.
56. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1985).
57. Turner, 476 U.S. at 37.
58. Id. at 33.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 33-34 (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985)).
61. Id. at 35.
62. Id. at 35-36.
63. Id. at 36-37.
64. Id. at 37.
65. Id. at 38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 45 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Court's most recent decision regarding the constitutional implications of
voir dire where the likelihood of jury bias is significant.66
B. The Death Penalty and the Eighth Amendment Proscription
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied
to the states by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment,67
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 68 In 1972, the Supreme Court
of the United States first heard and adjudicated a direct challenge to the
death penalty as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.69 In
Furman v. Georgia,70 the Court issued a short per curiam opinion hold-
ing Furman's death sentence unconstitutional. 7' The primary impact of
Furman was to invalidate virtually all pending death sentences. 72 Be-
yond that there was little agreement. All nine Justices, five concurring in
and four dissenting from the Court's opinion, wrote separately to express
their views about the constitutionality of the death penalty.73 In short,
the five concurring opinions expressed the view that the eighth amend-
ment, at the very least, prohibited the arbitrary and capricious imposi-
tion of the death penalty. Furman ultimately came to stand for the
proposition that because of its unique finality and severity, the death pen-
alty could be imposed only when a legislature made a positive determina-
tion that capital punishment served a valid penological justification.74
Further, the death penalty had to be administered within meaningful sen-
tencing guidelines for the jurors who made the grave decision whether a
particular human being would live or die. Many observers felt that the
decision in Furman was the end of capital punishment in America. 71
In the wake of Furman, however, a sizable majority of states reen-
66. Turner v. Murray was decided April 30, 1986. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
67. Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
68. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
378 (1910) (The amendment's meaning "is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire mean-
ing as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
69. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
70. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
71. Id. at 239-40.
72. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L.
R v. 21, 38 (1987).
73. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
74. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 301 (1987), where the Court comments on Furman and Gregg noting "that any punish.
ment might be unconstitutionally severe if inflicted without penological justification."
75. See, e.g., M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
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acted death penalty statutes.76 In examining five different post-Furman
death penalty statutes, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty is
not per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments." Instead, the Court developed both substantive
and procedural doctrines through which the death penalty could be con-
stitutionally administered. 8
These five cases evaluated the means by which Georgia, Florida,
North Carolina, Louisiana and Texas adjusted to Furman's prohibition
against standardless sentencing. Two states, North Carolina79 and Loui-
siana,8" adopted a mandatory death penalty for capital crimes. The
Court rejected these schemes because they only masked the problem of
arbitrariness and lack of standards in capital sentencing. 1 Such schemes
allowed juries to "nullify" the death penalty by acquitting, or by convict-
ing of lesser included offenses, those defendants that the juries wished to
spare.2 Further, and more important to the development of constitu-
tional-capital jurisprudence, the Court concluded that a mandatory
death penalty is unconstitutional if it fails to accord "significance to rele-
vant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense."83 The Court reasoned that a
mandatory death penalty:
excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment
of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely indi-
vidual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferenti-
ated mass to be subjected to blind infliction of the penalty of
76. See, e.g., Greenburg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 917 (1982);
Zimring and Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in
Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 927, 944-52 (1985). See also, McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302
n.23 (1987).
77. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
78. An exhaustive analysis of eighth amendment jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this
article. But see, e.g., W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES (1987); C. BLACK,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981); M.
MELTSNER, supra note 75; see also, Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the
Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741 (1987); Death Penalty Symposium, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 865-1480 (1985).
79. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
80. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
81. Id. at 333-36; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 299-305.
82. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03.
83. Id. at 304.
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death.84
Consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense is a constitutionally indispen-
sable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.85
Unlike the mandatory capital sentencing statutes, each statute
which established guidance for discretion in capital sentencing passed
constitutional muster.86 In Gregg v. Georgia,87 the Court approved of a
bifurcated sentencing process whereby guilt or innocence is first adjudi-
cated and, if a capital conviction results, the sentencer proceeds to a sep-
arate sentencing hearing. 8 The Court expressly approved, as a
constitutionally mandated feature of any capital-sentencing procedure,
the narrowing of the class of cases for which death could be imposed.89
That narrowing function was performed by factors which could render
certain crimes relatively more heinous than crimes in which the factors
did not exist.9"
Hence, the five decisions established the twin doctrines which have
evolved as the major lines of constitutional capital-sentencing jurispru-
dence. On the one hand, "in order to minimize the risk that the death
penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders,
the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sen-
tencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the
crime and the defendant." 91 On the other hand, "in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitution-
ally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." 92
Since 1976, the Court has refined the twin doctrines by adjudicating
cases that question their breadth as well as the imposition of the death
penalty on other grounds. For example, the Court has clarified that the
eighth amendment's need for proportionality in sentencing 93 virtually
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
87. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
88. Id. at 195.
89. Id. at 196-98.
90. Id. at 197.
91. Id. at 199.
92. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
93. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (eighth amendment requires proportionality
analysis to ensure that death penalty is proportional to gravity of offense and sentences im-
posed upon other criminals).
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prohibits the death sentence for any crime except murder.94 The Court
has also held that the execution of the "presently insane," those persons
who lack the understanding of the consequences and rationale of the
punishment of death, is violative of the eighth amendment because it
lacks any legitimate justification-it performs neither retributive nor de-
terrent functions.95
The eighth amendment requirement of objective standards to select
the murder cases where capital punishment may be imposed is met if the
classifications "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and ... reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.",
96
It is not constitutionally significant whether the narrowing function is
performed by narrowly drawn definitions of capital murder or by aggra-
vating circumstances employed by the sentencer at the penalty phase of a
capital trial.97 Nor is it a matter of constitutional significance if the sen-
tencer is presented with evidence erroneously labelled as an aggravating
circumstance so long as the evidence is relevant, admissible and not
otherwise constitutionally impermissible.
98
A hallmark of eighth amendment jurisprudence is the strenuous en-
forcement of the principle that the defendant not be precluded from
presenting, nor the sentencer precluded from considering, any evidence
related to the circumstances of the individual offender or the particular
offense proffered as a basis for a sentence less than death.9 9 Other proce-
dural safeguards delineated for capital defendants include a defendant's
right to a lesser included offense instruction, when warranted by the evi-
dence so that the jury is not forced to choose between a conviction for a
capital crime and an outright acquittal."°° In the interest of promoting
more reliable sentencing deteriinations, 1° ' the Court has also concluded
94. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
158 (1987) (death sentence proportionate to major participation in felony resulting in murder
when acting with reckless indifference to value of human life).
95. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1986).
96. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546, 554 (1988) (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 555.
98. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
99. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2946 (1989); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393,
398-99 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1987) (sentencer cannot be precluded from
hearing evidence regarding the defendant's character as mitigating evidence); Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979) (enforcement of state law evidentiary rule to preclude
defendant's proffer of relevant mitigating evidence violative of Due Process Clause).
100. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43
(1980).
101. Gardner v. Florida, 340 U.S. 349 (1977).
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that a capital defendant has a due process right to be confronted with,
and provided an opportunity to rebut, otherwise confidential pre-sen-
tence investigation reports and other evidence upon which the sentencer
relies.
C Capital Punishment and the Right to an Impartial Jury
Likewise, special sixth and fourteenth amendment rights exist which
attend capital jury trials. In the 1968 case of Witherspoon v. Illinois,1 2
the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the
State of Illinois could constitutionally remove for cause all prospective
jurors who, during voir dire, expressed general reservations about capital
punishment. 10 3 Concluding that "a State may not entrust the determina-
tion of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return
a verdict of death,"' 4 the Court held "that a sentence of death cannot
be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by
excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objec-
tions to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against its infliction."1 °5 Noting that:
[t]he most that can be demanded of a venireman... is that he
be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law,
and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has
begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the
facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the
proceedings,
10 6
the Court prohibited a state's excusal of prospective jurors for cause un-
less they "made unmistakably clear" that they would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment or their attitude would pre-
vent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's
guilt. 107
The Witherspoon Court declined to address the secondary issue of
whether the process of "death-qualification,"-insuring that the jurors
could follow the law and consider the imposition of a death sentence-
skewed the jury toward conviction.108 The petitioner cited surveys to
show that jurors who were not conscientiously opposed to capital punish-
102. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
103. Id. at 513.
104. Id. at 521.
'105. Id. at 522.
106. Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 517-18.
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ment were more likely to convict, and that the defendant's chances for
acquittal were lessened if jurors who objected to the death penalty were
excluded. 1o9 The Court rejected the data as "too tentative and fragmen-
tary" to show a bias toward conviction.110 These jurors' views on the
death penalty ordinarily would not be explored during voir dire in non-
capital criminal trials. Hence, when judged against non-capital criminal
jurors, "death-qualified" jurors were more prone to convict, and there-
fore unrepresentative and not impartial. The Court concluded, however,
that the evidence was "too tentative and fragmentary" to hold that any
death- qualification process rendered all capital convictions uncon-
stitutional. ' "
The "unmistakable clarity" standard for excusal in the "death quali-
fication" process has since been modified by the Court to allow excusal
upon a factual finding by the trial court that the prospective juror's views
about capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair" his
ability to perform his duties as a juror. 1 2 However, the primary holding
of Witherspoon remains intact. Further, the Court has applied the same
standard to jurors who indicate their views in favor of capital punish-
ment prevent or substantially impair their ability to perform their duties
as jurors.13
In the 1986 decision of Lockhart v. McCree,"4 the Court squarely
addressed the question left open in Witherspoon regarding the "convic-
tion-proneness" of death qualified jurors. The data that Witherspoon dis-
missed as "too tentative and fragmentary" had been expanded by further
evidence suggesting that "death-qualified" jurors were more "conviction-
prone" than other petit jurors." 5 However, the McCree Court remained
unpersuaded. 1 6 After severely criticizing the data, 1 ' Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, assumed arguendo that the data established "that
'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-
109. Id. at 517 n.10.
110. Id. at 517.
111. Id. at 517-18.
112. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45
(1980).
113. Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2276-77 (1988).
114. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
115. Id. at 170-71.
116. Id. at 183-84.
117. For a detailed analysis of the data presented in Witherspoon and McCree, and the
Court's historical trouble understanding and applying social science data, see Seltzer, Lopes,
Dayan and Canan, The Effect of Death Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to Convict:
The Maryland Example, 29 HOWARD L.J., 571, 576-81, 587-93 (1986).
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prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries.""'  He noted that the sixth
amendment's fair cross-section requirement has never been applied to the
petit jury, and to do so would be "unworkable and unsound."" 9 Addi-
tionally, "Witherspoon-excludables," the automatic death penalty oppo-
nents, are not a distinctive group, as that term has been employed in the
context of fair cross-section challenges.
120
The Court also addressed the secondary claim that even if no fair
cross-section violation in excluding scrupled jurors existed, the skewing
process of death qualification deprived a defendant of an impartial jury in
violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.12 ' This argument,
too, was rejected by the Court as "illogical and hopelessly impracti-
cal."122 The Court held that "a jury selected from a fair cross-section of
the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual view-
points actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can consci-
entiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the
facts of the particular case."' 123 Showing more concern for capital sen-
tencing than for guilt determination, the Court expressly distinguished
Witherspoon, noting that McCree dealt with impartiality as to the guilt
determination, while Witherspoon involved capital sentencing.1
24
Witherspoon and its progeny, together with McCree, appear to set
the boundaries of the Court's concern with the interplay of sixth and
eighth amendment jurisprudence. Clearly, Witherspoon and Turner v.
Murray 125 indicate that the Court is willing to put teeth into the eighth
amendment, but equally clear from McCree and Turner is the Court's
unwillingness to expand the doctrine to the guilt- determination phase of
capital cases.
II. DISCOVERING JUROR MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PAROLE
ELIGIBILITY AND THE EFFECT OF A LIFE SENTENCE TO
ENSURE RELIABILITY IN THE CAPITAL
SENTENCING DECISION
A fundamental tenet of the American judicial system is the constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to an impartial jury.126 Ancillary to this right
118. McCree, 476 U.S. at 173.
119. Id. at 174.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 177.
122. Id. at 178.
123. Id. at 184.
124. Id at 183.
125. 478 U.S. 28 (1986).
126. See generally Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 (1986).
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is the opportunity to take reasonable steps, primarily through the voir
dire process, to ensure juror impartiality.127 A party's challenges to pro-
spective jurors, either for cause or peremptory, may well be the most
effective way to ferret out latent prejudices in potential jurors.
128
Although wide discretion is accorded trial judges in the conduct of voir
dire,129 that discretion is not unfettered130 and counsel should be ac-
corded wide latitude in examining prospective jurors, particularly in light
of the eighth amendment's requirement of heightened reliability in capi-
tal cases.131 The primary purpose of inquiry during voir dire is to elimi-
nate extremism and partiality. 3 2 Accordingly, limitations on voir dire
examination creating unreasonable risks of bias or prejudice violate due
process.' 33 Capital juries are entrusted to render a "highly subjective,
'unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a partic-
ular person deserves.' "34 Therefore, a defendant's right to an impartial
jury, obtained primarily through the jury-selection process, must be
closely safeguarded. By their very nature, capital cases often involve
crimes far more repugnant than those crimes involved in non-capital
cases. A far greater likelihood exists that biases and prejudices may op-
erate undetected in capital cases.
135
Furthermore, due process requires the sentencer to impose a sen-
tence only with full knowledge of the range of discretionary sentencing
alternatives.1 36 When facing a genuine issue as to the sentencing judge's
understanding of available sentencing alternatives, a reviewing court
should accord the defendant a hearing before an alternative judge, so that
an independent determination may be made as to whether the sentencing
judge failed to exercise informed discretion. 137 For when:
127. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
128. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 405 (1894).
129. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190; Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976); State v.
Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 682, 268 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1980).
130. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1112-15 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lewin, 467
F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1972).
131. See supra note 78.
132. See State v. Honeycutt, 285 N.C. 174, 203 S.E.2d 844 (1974), death sent. vacated, 428
U.S. 903 (1976).
133. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 20, 37 (1986); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.
524, 527 (1973).
134. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340-41 n.7 (1985) (quoting Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
135. Turner, 476 U.S. at 35.
136. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1980); Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 703
(5th Cir. 1988).
137. Anderson v. Jones, 743 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1984); Hickerson v. Maggio, 691 F.2d
792, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1982).
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a judge, tutored in all the nuances of the law, must exercise
informed discretion in sentencing, it is all the more important
for lay jurors, who have convicted a defendant of a capital of-
fense and must then say whether he will die or live, to under-
stand fully the consequences of their decision.
1 31
Prospective jurors often maintain the common misconception that a
life sentence is not, in reality, a life sentence. Unquestionably, the public
holds gross misconceptions about the actual effect of imposing a life sen-
tence in a first-degree murder conviction. 39 According to one survey,
seventy percent of the American people believe that a person given a life
sentence will not remain incarcerated for the remainder of his life. 140 A
recent study in Georgia revealed that the average juror believed that a
murderer given a life sentence would be released in seven or eight
years.14 The public is inundated with media references to parole re-
leases for convicted killers. These reports often fail to distinguish be-
138. King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055, 1062 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 820
(1988) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
139. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misconceptions Concerning Pa-
role in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COL. HUMAN RTS. L. REv., Spring 1987, at
211.
140. Bennack, The Public, the Media, and the Judicial System: A National Survey of Citi-
zen's Awareness, 7 STATE CT. J., Fall 1983, 4, 10.
141. Codner, The Only Game In Town: Crapping Out in Capital Cases Because of Juror
Misconceptions About Parole, 47-50 (Jan. 24, 1986) (unpublished paper, University of Michi-
gan School of Law) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
Several states offer life in prison without the possibility of parole as the only alternative to
a death sentence. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46(e)(l)-(2) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-4-
603(b)-(c) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-35(I) (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209 (1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4)
(Vernon 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:l-a(III) (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 24-15-4 (1988); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-402 (1987). One state has changed its law to require all
capital offenders sentenced after 1985 to serve forty years in prison before being eligible for
parole. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 17-22.5-104(2)(a) (1986). Three other states require at least
twenty-five years in prison before a convict serving a life sentence may be considered for pa-
role. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703-A (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West
Supp. 1989) (life without possibility of parole available); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (West
1976).
Other states with determinable parole-eligibility statutes require at least ten years in
prison, with most requiring at least twenty years. See IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1987) (ten
years); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11-13, para. 3-2(b)(3) (1988) (twenty years); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 11-13-3-2, 35-50-2-3(a) (Burns 1988) (fifteen years); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3(1) (1989)
(ten years); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.030(4) (Michie 1985) (ten years); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1371(al) (1988) (twenty years); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105(2) (1985) (twenty years);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12 subsec. 15 (Vernon 1979) (twenty years); VA. CODE
ANN. § 53.1-151 (1988) (fifteen years; may be increased to twenty or life without possibility of
parole under certain circumstances); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.115 (1988) (twenty
years).
However, two states allow their parole boards unfettered discretion in making parole deci-
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tween persons convicted of first-degree murder and persons sentenced for
lesser degrees of homicide. Given these incomplete accounts, the public
gleans the impression that a life sentence does not mean a life sentence.
Closely akin to this notion is the public perception known as the
Slovik syndrome: the expectation that the sentence will not be carried
out.14 2 This syndrome derives its name from the death sentence imposed
on November 11, 1944 by a general court-martial on Private Eddie
Slovik, the only American serviceman executed for desertion since
1864.143 Many levels of military command which reviewed Slovik's sen-
tence were authorized to exercise clemency."4 Yet none did so.'4 5 Long
after Private Slovik's death, the presiding officer of the court-martial was
asked about the severe sentence. 14 6 He responded that no member of the
sentencing panel believed the sentence would ever be carried out. 14 7 Per-
sons imposing sentences may operate under this syndrome by underesti-
mating the time a defendant will serve before parole is granted. 148
If jurors in capital cases harbor misconceptions about parole eligibil-
ity from a life sentence and those misconceptions affect the ultimate sen-
tencing recommendation, then counsel should be able to question
prospective jurors to facilitate the intelligent exercise of challenges, either
for cause or peremptory. The following two sections consider both the
empirical data regarding juror perceptions about parole eligibility and
the current judicial climate regarding voir dire in this area.
A. Data Demonstrating Juror Misconceptions About Parole Eligibility
Limited data are beginning to emerge demonstrating the existence of
juror misconceptions about parole eligibility for defendants receiving life
sentences for first-degree murder. 4 9 Most of this information arises
from interviews with jurors in specific cases or from a sampling of a par-
sions. See Op. Att'y Gen., Okla., No. 69-207 (August 21, 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-9
(1988).
For a more exhaustive treatment of parole eligibility in sentencing, see Tabak & Lane, The
Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 61, 128 (1989).
142. Newman, Foreword to Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Pro-
cess, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 812 (1975).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. W. Hum, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK 169 (1970).
148. Newman, supra note 142, at 812.
149. See infra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ticular venire.150 Despite its statistical limitations, this information pro-
vides a solid basis for positing the need for voir dire questioning of the
opinions held by prospective jurors as to the effect of a life sentence, the
status of parole eligibility, and the likelihood of and time table for even-
tual release.
The case of Michael Ray Quesinberry provides a graphic illustration
of the existence of juror misconceptions about parole and of the detri-
mental effect of those misconceptions on a capital-sentencing recommen-
dation. 5' Quesinberry had been convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death.152 After winning a new sentencing hearing on ap-
peal,15 3 he was again sentenced to die.' 5 4  His second jury recom-
mended 155 this sentence upon finding one aggravating circumstance: a
murder committed for pecuniary gain.' 56 The second jury also found
seven mitigating circumstances: defendant's lack of a significant history
of prior criminal activity; defendant's lack of assaultive behavior prior to
the murder; defendant's adaptability to life in custody; defendant's vol-
untary confession to the crime; defendant's cooperation with law enforce-
ment officers; defendant's remorse for the crime; and that the crime was
out of character for defendant. '17 Immediately after a judgment of death
was entered, one juror stated to a newspaper reporter: "If a person de-
serves a life sentence and gets it, he should serve life, instead of going and
pulling five or ten years and getting parole."'5 8 Another juror similarly
remarked: "We felt with the possibility of him being out in a short time,
that wasn't fair."'
' 5 9
Given this information, defendant filed a motion for appropriate re-
lief'60 with the trial court asking that his sentence of death be set aside. 
161
Various documents, including affidavits from two jurors other than those
who spoke with the newspaper reporter, supported the motion. One ju-
150. See infra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
151. State v. Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 354 S.E.2d 446 (1987), appeal after remand, No.
95A88 (N.C. Jul. 26, 1989) (Westlaw 1989 WL 83308).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at 223-24 n.35.
156. State v. Quesinberry, No. 95A88 (N.C. Jul. 26, 1989) (Westlaw 1989 WL 83308).
157. Id.
158. Greensboro News & Record, Feb. 3, 1988, at Capital A6, col. 1.
159. Id.
160. North Carolina permits a defendant to file a post-trial motion within ten days of the
entry of judgment challenging, inter alia, the fairness and impartiality of the trial. N.C. GeN.
STAT. § 15A-1414(b)(3) (1988).
161. Motion for Appropriate Relief, State v. Quesinberry, No. 83-CrS-05 & 06 (Superior
Court for Randolph County, filed February 12, 1988).
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ror admitted that "[t]he question of parole was a primary factor in our
deliberations."16
[S]everal of the women jurors expressed concern that if [the de-
fendant] received a life sentence he would be released on parole
in ten (10) years, return to his drug use and commit another
murder.... [T]en (10) years was the time period that we used
during our deliberations about how much time [the defendant]
would actually spend in prison if a life sentence was returned. 163
This estimation of parole release was the determining factor in the jury's
decision to return a death sentence. 1 Another juror agreed, saying
"[t]he possibility of parole was a pretty hot issue during the delibera-
tions." 16' The jury maintained that a life sentence would cause the de-
fendant to "serve approximately ten (10), and no more than twelve (12),
years in prison. "166
The trial court denied the motion to set aside the death sentence and
the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.1 6' The decision turned
on the impropriety of allowing jurors to impeach their verdict by re-
vealing internal rather than external influences.1 68  Nevertheless, these
facts demonstrate the existence and effect of juror misconceptions about
parole in capital cases, as North Carolina requires a defendant given a
life sentence for first-degree murder to serve twenty years before becom-
162. Id. at app. B at 2.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id.
165. Id., app. F at 1.
166. Id.
167. State v. Quesinberry, No. 95A88 (N.C. Jul. 26, 1989) (Westlaw 1989 WL 83308).
168. Id. at 12-14. See also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987); State v. Rosier,
322 N.C. 826, 370 S.E.2d 359 (1988); N.C.R. EvID. 606(b). As the Quesinberry court
explained:
Under North Carolina Rule 606(b) .... allegations that jurors considered de-
fendant's possibility of parole during their deliberations are allegations of "internal"
influences on the jury. First, the "information" that defendant would be eligible for
parole in about ten years was not information dealing with this particular defendant,
but general information concerning the possibility of parole for a person sentenced to
life imprisonment for first degree murder. Second, there is no allegation that the
jurors received information about parole eligibility from an outside source. The juror
affidavits state that it was the jurors' "idea," "belief," or "impression" that defendant
would be released in ten years. We have said that "[i]t would be naive to believe
jurors during jury deliberations do not relate the experiences they have had," and
that "the possibility of parole or executive clemency is a matter of common knowl-
edge among most adult persons." Most jurors, through their own experience and
common knowledge, know that a life sentence does not necessarily mean that the
defendant will remain in prison for the rest of his life. Therefore, the jurors' "belief"
about defendant's possibility of parole was an "internal" influence on the jury.
State v. Quesinberry, No. 95A88 (N.C. Jul. 26, 1989) (Westlaw 1989 WL 83308) (citations
omitted).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ing eligible for parole.169
A Georgia case involving potential jurors had foreshadowed the
North Carolina experience.17 After John Pope was sentenced to die, a
random sample of his venire was surveyed regarding parole eligibility.
71
Those persons were asked "if a person receives a life sentence for murder,
how many years on the average do you think they [sic] spend in prison
before they [sic] are paroled?"1 72 The mean response was 8.13 years,
while thirty-five percent of the respondents (the mode) felt a defendant
convicted of first-degree murder would be paroled after seven years.
17 3
Given Pope's previous incarceration under a life sentence, he would have
been required to serve a minimum of twenty-five years before becoming
eligible for parole if he had been given a life sentence for the murder in
question. 74 These erroneous assumptions weighed heavily in the hypo-
thetical penalty consideration. "Over two-thirds of the potential jurors
stated they would be more likely to impose a sentence of life if assured
that 'life' meant at least twenty-five years."'175 Thus, Pope's potential
jury, like Quesinberry's actual jury, harbored gross misconceptions about
parole eligibility and ultimate release. In all likelihood, his jury, like
Quesinberry's, acted on these misconceptions.
A similar experience occurred in Mississippi. During a survey con-
ducted in connection with a motion for a new trial, defense counsel ques-
tioned various persons from the jury venire.17 6 Thirty-one persons
responded to the following question: "If a person receives a life sentence
for murder, how many years on the average do you think they [sic] spend
in prison before they [sic] are paroled?" Twenty people, nearly two-
thirds of those questioned, believed the defendant would be paroled in
five to ten years.' 77 In actuality, having been indicted as a habitual of-
fender, the defendant would not have been eligible for parole if given a
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(a) (1988).
170. Codner, supra note 141; Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at 220-25.
171. For a discussion of the research designed for this study, see Codner, supra note 141, at
46 n.115; Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at 220-23 nn.31-34.
172. Codner, supra note 141, at 46 n.l 15; Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at
221-22 n.31.
173. Codner, supra note 141, at 46 n.116; Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at 222
n.33.
174. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-39 (1985) (persons receiving life sentence for first-degree mur-
der who have been imprisoned previously on life sentence required to serve twenty-five years
before becoming eligible for parole).
175. Codner, supra note 141, at 46 n.116; Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at
222-23.
176. Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at 223-24 n.35.
177. Id.
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life sentence.17 8  Furthermore, twenty of the thirty-one respondents
would have been more likely to return a life sentence if they knew the
person would never be eligible for parole. 179
In Maryland, defense counsel have conducted post-verdict inter-
views " ° with thirty jurors from six capital trials, four of which resulted
in life sentences and two of which resulted in death sentences. Sixty per-
cent of these jurors acknowledged that their sentencing decision was af-
fected by knowing a defendant might eventually be released if a life
sentence was imposed. When asked how many years, on the average,
they thought a defendant would actually spend in jail if sentenced to life
in prison, one-half of the jurors felt only ten to fifteen years would be
served.
The effect of these misconceptions was also revealed. Of the jurors
who entered the deliberations favoring a sentence of death, fifty percent
held this opinion because the defendant might be paroled.
Various judicial decisions also reveal that jurors discuss parole dur-
ing their deliberations on sentencing.' 8' Often, jurors request specific in-
formation from the trial court on this issue.182 Typically, the jury is
simply told that the matter of parole eligibility is not a proper considera-
tion in the punishment recommendation and that the jury should not
consider it.'83 In light of the Quesinberry and Pope experiences, 184 the
effectiveness of such an instruction is doubtful. The courts have also
failed to intervene even in the face of evidence showing that punishment
was enhanced based upon underestimations of parole eligibility.'85
From all indications, jurors harbor gross misconceptions about pa-
role eligibility and actual time served under a life sentence imposed fol-
lowing conviction for first-degree murder. Jurors also act on this
erroneous information. Against this backdrop, the next section considers
the propriety of conducting voir dire regarding these attitudes.
178. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
179. Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 139, at 224 n.35.
180. These jurors were interviewed during 1986. A compilation of their responses to vari-
ous questions were provided to the authors by Gary W. Christopher of the Office of the Public
Defender in Baltimore, Maryland. Dr. Richard Seltzer, Howard University, supervised the
gathering of this material. The authors greatly appreciate the source of this information. A
copy of the tabulated responses is on file with the authors.
181. See, eg., State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279, cert. denied, 108 U.S. 269
(1987); Keady v. State, 687 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
182. See, e.g., Robbins, 319 N.C. at 518, 356 S.E.2d at 310.
183. See, e.g., id.
184. See supra notes 151-75 and accompanying text.
185. Keady, 687 S.W.2d at 760.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
B. Voir Dire Concerning Knowledge of Parole Eligibility
Voir dire challenges to potential jurors represent one step toward
achieving the goal of an impartial jury. 86 Intelligent use of these chal-
lenges can be made only after a reasonably thorough voir dire examina-
tion. Placing limitations on voir dire which creates risk of bias or
prejudice is unconstitutional. 87 When prospective jurors have fixed
opinions because of pretrial publicity such that they can no longer make
an impartial judgment, due process prohibits their service.' 88 In such a
situation, a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to conduct a
thorough voir dire. 8 9 Similarly, a defendant accused of an interracial
capital murder must be permitted to question prospective jurors on the
issue of racial prejudice. 9 In Turner v. Murray,9 ' certain "special cir-
cumstances" gave rise to "an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice in-
fecting the capital sentencing proceeding,... [including] the fact that the
crime charged involved interracial violence, the broad discretion given
the jury at the death-penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the
risk of improper sentencing in a capital case." '192
The "special circumstances" articulated in Turner provide an ap-
propriate framework for analyzing the right to question prospective ju-
rors regarding their knowledge and attitudes about parole eligibility. As
the Court noted, the jury in a capital sentencing hearing retains broad
discretion with respect to the penalty imposed.193 Furthermore, and per-
haps more importantly, the Court voiced concern at "the risk of im-
proper sentencing in a capital case."' 94 Surely, if these concerns are
sufficient to permit a black defendant to question prospective jurors on
the issue of racial prejudice, any defendant facing a jury that will deter-
mine whether he lives or dies should be able to inquire as to their knowl-
edge of and attitudes concerning parole eligibility. As documented by
the data from North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Maryland, ju-
rors harbor and act upon serious misconceptions about parole.' Their
186. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
187. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524
(1973).
188. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
189. See, eg., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
190. E.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
191. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
192. Id. at 37; accord Ham, 409 U.S. at 525 (allowing black defendant accused of possession
of marijuana to question prospective jurors regarding racial prejudice and civil rights activi-
ties). See supra notes 12-66 and accompanying text.
193. Turner, 476 U.S. at 35.
194. Id. at 36.
195. See supra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
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actions upon such erroneous information creates a risk of improper
sentences in capital cases.
This issue has been squarely addressed and rejected in capital cases
in two jurisdictions. 196 In King v. Lynaugh, the Fifth Circuit rejected
any basis for "constitutionalizing ... voir dire consideration of parole
eligibility." 197 According to the Fifth Circuit, only racial prejudice and
provocative pretrial publicity form an acceptable basis for a constitu-
tional challenge to a voir dire procedure. 98 Heavy reliance was placed
upon the rejection in Ham v. South Carolina199 of a claim to question
prospective jurors concerning possible prejudice toward people with
beards:
Ham's trial and conviction occurred circa the late 1960s
and early 1970s, at the apogee of student and political activism,
when the wearing of a beard might well have been thought to
prejudice many prospective jurors. Nevertheless, the Court re-
fused to constitutionalize an inquiry which, in its view, would
have suggested no principled limits on intrusive appellate re-
view of voir dire.
We, likewise, are unable to distinguish possible prejudice
based on jurors' misconceptions about parole law from "a host
of other possible similar prejudices." ... Interrogating venire-
men about Texas parole law raises, if anything, a more attenu-
ated possibility of prejudice than does a question about jurors'
attitudes toward people with beards. 2"
Analogizing juror misconceptions about parole eligibility to attitudes re-
garding beards unduly trivializes the constitutional question. It belies
the facts, demonstrated from data gathered in numerous states, that ju-
rors harbor misconceptions about parole and proceed to act upon them
in the capital sentencing determination. To say that such concerns raise
"a more attenuated possibility of prejudice' '2dl than attitudes about peo-
ple who wear beards ignores reality.
The Fifth Circuit also noted that "[t]he views of a lay veniremen
about parole are no more likely to be both erroneous and prejudicial than
are his views on the defendant's right not to take the stand, the law of
196. King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 820,
109 S. Ct. 1563 (1989); State v. McNeil, 324 N.C. 33, 375 S.E.2d 909, petition for cert. filed,
(Apr. 24, 1989).
197. King, 850 F.2d at 1059.
198. Id.
199. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
200. King, 850 F.2d at 1060.
201. Id.
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parties, the reasonable doubt standard, or any other matter of criminal
procedure."202 This statement implies that a defendant could be pre-
cluded from questioning prospective jurors regarding their knowledge of
and attitudes toward matters such as the presumption of innocence and a
defendant's constitutional right not to testify. As a practical matter, of
course, prosecutors and defense counsel alike routinely question jurors
about these matters.
King also placed great reliance upon jury instructions to disregard
parole in the deliberations: "If the jurors paid attention during voir dire
and followed the trial court's charge, as we generally presume they do,
any pre-existing misconception about parole law would have been ig-
nored. '20 3 As the experiences in North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi
and Maryland reveal, however, jurors may be routinely acting upon their
misconceptions about parole law irrespective of instructions to the
contrary.20
The second jurisdiction to reject a defendant's claim regarding in-
ability to voir dire prospective jurors about parole was North Caro-
lina. 05 The North Carolina Supreme Court, relying on King, concluded
"that to 're-inject notions of parole eligibility at the forefront of the judi-
cial proceedings,' . . . would be an improvident practice. '20 6 Other
courts have adjudged this request an improvident practice based upon
the well-settled notion that jurors in capital cases are forbidden from
considering the possibility of parole in their deliberations as to
sentence.207
The rationale of these decisions is fatally flawed. At bottom, they
rest upon the assumption that jurors follow the trial court's instructions
and do not consider the matter of parole in their capital-sentencing deter-
mination. All of the empirical evidence demonstrates this is not the
case.208 Rather, average jurors who continually read media "reports of
grisly crimes committed by parolees" believe, however erroneously, "that
most convicted murderers are back on the streets in less than ten
years. ' 20 9 Thus, an unreasonable risk exists that misconceptions about
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
205. McNeil, 324 N.C. at 43, 375 S.E.2d at 916.
206. Id. at 44, 375 S.E.2d at 916 (quoting King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir.
1988) (en bane), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 820, 109 S. Ct. 1563 (1989)).
207. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Robbins,
319 N.C. 465, 518, 356 S.E.2d 279, 310, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
208. See supra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
209. King, 850 F.2d at 1062 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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the possibility of a capital defendant's release may lead a jury to impose a
sentence of death. To simply deem such voir dire "an improvident prac-
tice" pays undue homage to the ways of the past in defiance of new
information.
As a related matter, a defendant should be permitted to introduce
evidence of his ineligibility for parole for a substantial period of time.
Any significant time during which a defendant is ineligible for parole
should be considered as a mitigating factor during sentencing.2 1 The
sentencer in a capital case may
"not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death" ..... Equally clear is the corollary
rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be pre-
cluded from considering "any relevant mitigating evidence."'2 I
These rules are "well established" '12 and "beyond dispute."2 3 In Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma,214 the Court held that, once a state legislature per-
mits consideration of any of a myriad of circumstances as might form the
basis for a sentence less than death, the sentencer is required to listen to a
proffered circumstance.21 5 A state may not then limit the sentencer's
consideration of any relevant circumstance that might cause it to impose
a sentence less than death. 216 Any relevant information offered by the
defendant in this regard must be considered. 17
I On this basis, a defendant facing the death penalty should be al-
lowed to place before the sentencing jury relevant and competent evi-
dence regarding his eligibility for parole should a life sentence be
granted.21 8 The sentencing authority may use any relevant evidence
which causes it to believe that death may not be appropriate and allow
210. The mitigating effect of ineligibility for parole for a substantial period of time might
work as follows: If a defendant is found guilty of a particularly heinous crime, the sentencing
jury might want to ensure that the defendant serve at least ten years. If the jury thought he
would serve only one-half of any sentence imposed, it might sentence him to twenty years
thinking that even if the defendant was released on good behavior after ten years, at least ten
years would be served. However, if the jury knew he would be ineligible for parole for at least
the next ten years a sentence of only ten years may be imposed.
211. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
212. Id. at 4.
213. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1865 (1988).
214. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
215. Id. at 115 n.10.
216. Id. at 113-14.
217. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1774 (1987).
218. See Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 411-12, 545 A.2d 1281, 1295 (1988).
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such mitigating evidence to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.219
In Doering v. State,2 ° the Maryland Supreme Court noted "that a
jury seeking to determine the appropriateness of a life sentence will be
aided by information correctly describing the legal and practical effects
of such a sentence, and that the existence of an appropriate alternative
sentence must certainly be considered a relevant mitigating circum-
stance."22 The Doering court concluded that a defendant is entitled to
have the jury consider relevant, competent, and non-misleading informa-
tion "concerning his eligibility for parole in the event a life sentence is
imposed ... 222
It is beyond peradventure that jurors harbor misconceptions about
parole eligibility for persons given a life sentence upon conviction of first-
degree murder.223 Moreover, jurors act on this erroneous information.224
A defendant facing a jury's decision of life or death can only hope for an
impartial decision if prospective jurors are questioned on their knowledge
of and attitudes toward parole. Persons unable to make an impartial sen-
tencing decision may then be removed. To deny him that opportunity
contravenes basic constitutional principles.
III. IDENTIFYING AND EXCUSING JURORS UNABLE TO CONSIDER
MITIGATING EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY THE DEFENSE FOR
THE PENALTY PHASE OF THE TRIAL
The sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee that a capital defendant may not be sentenced to
death by persons unable to conscientiously consider mitigating evidence
"stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind" offered by the de-
fendant as a reason not to sentence him to death.225 Where a defendant
can show potential for a "per se bias '226 against these "mitigating" fac-
tors among the jurors who may have to choose between a sentence of life
imprisonment and a sentence of death, he should be allowed to: (1) ex-
plore this potential on voir dire; (2) exclude for cause those jurors who
219. See Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 475, 499 A.2d 1236, 1254 (1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1010 (1986).
220. 313 Md. 384, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988).
221. Id. at 411-12, 545 A.2d at 1295.
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
225. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
226. This Article defines per se bias as a bias against the potential effect of a class of evi-
dence to mitigate the severity of a crime based not on the facts of a particular case but on a
belief that such evidence is not, and can never be, mitigating.
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express such a bias; and, (3) where peremptory challenges are available,
peremptorily excuse those jurors whose responses, while not sufficiently
biased to warrant excusal for cause, nevertheless give the defendant
pause.
The focus of eighth amendment jurisprudence in capital cases has
centered, to a large extent, on delineating constitutionally appropriate
considerations for the sentencer that carefully constrain discretion.
2 2 7
While these have not been developed completely, there are some sentenc-
ing considerations upon which the Constitution permits no discretion.228
"The sentencer... may determine the weight to be given relevant miti-
gating evidence. But [the sentencer] may not give it no weight by exclud-
ing such evidence from [its] consideration." '2 9 The United States
Supreme Court has applied at least two working definitions for constitu-
tionally relevant mitigating circumstances. One definition focuses on the
individual culpability of the defendant. "[D]efendants who commit
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to
emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants
who have no such excuse."2 30 The other definition of mitigating circum-
stances is much broader. It focuses on evidence from which the sen-
tencer could draw "favorable inferences from the testimony . . . that
would be mitigating in the sense that they might serve as a basis for a
sentence less than death." '2 3 1 Given that the sentencer may not refuse to
consider relevant mitigating evidence and must give it independent miti-
gating weight,232 prospective jurors who are unwilling to weigh mitigat-
ing evidence due to their per se bias against such evidence should not be
227. See e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (eighth amendment's requirement of
proportionality analysis virtually prohibits death penalty except for murder); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (sentencer must listen to mitigating evidence offered by
defendant to avoid imposition of death); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (Stew-
art, Blackmun, Powell & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion) (state must sentence similarly situated
defendants in a similar manner); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (state must chan-
nel sentencers discretion to impose death by clear and objective standards); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (sentencer's discretion must be constrained by state through specific
and detailed guidance); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (constraint of
sentencer's discretion must make the process for imposing death rationally reviewable).
228. See, eg., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (eighth amendment prohibits execu-
tion of presently insane); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (eighth amendment does not
permit imposition of death penalty on defendant who without intent to kill, aids and abets
felony which results in murder committed by others).
229. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982).
230. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., -concurring). See also,
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
231. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5.
232. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1866 (1988); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15.
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eligible for jury service and should be excused for cause-such jurors are
clearly unable to follow the law.
Establishing whether prospective jurors harbor per se biases against
particular mitigating circumstances should be a function of voir dire.
The Court has noted that:
Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal
defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's
responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able
impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the
evidence cannot be fulfilled. . . . Similarly, lack of adequate
voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory
challenges where provided by statute or rule .... "I
Case law suggests that the Constitution compels voir dire questioning
about such bias. For example, in Ristaino v. Ross2 34 the Court recog-
nized that where a defendant can show a constitutionally significant like-
lihood that, absent specific questioning about racial bias, "the jurors
would not be indifferent as [they stand] unsworne, ' 2 35 that failure to ask
such questions during voir dire would be reversible error.
The rationale of Turner v. Murray,2 36 which held that the accusation
of an interracial capital crime entitles the defendant to voir dire the ve-
nire members about racial bias, persuades and compels the conclusion
that a capital defendant is entitled to voir dire the venire members about
per se bias against mitigating circumstances.237 The Turner Court noted
that the wide discretion granted to a jury in capital sentencing makes
such a proceeding uniquely susceptible to undetected bias. The Court
stated that "[b]ecause of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a
capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for.., prejudice
to operate but remain undetected. 2 31 Undetected prejudice is particu-
larly likely in jurisdictions that grant broad discretion to the sentencing
jury after the defendant has been found to be eligible for the death sen-
tence based on a finding of aggravating circumstances. 239 Even in those
233. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (citations omitted).
234. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
235. Id. at 596-97 (quoting Coke on Littleton, 155b (19th ed. 1832)).
236. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
237. Id. at 33.
238. Id. at 35.
239. Id. at 34. Such jurisdictions include: Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)
(1987)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c) (1985)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1
(1988)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (1985)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.030(4) (Baldwin 1985)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 905.6 (West Supp. 1989));
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jurisdictions that provide more narrow guidelines for imposition of the
death penalty, this constitutional obligation would still require the sen-
tencer to consider mitigating circumstances. 24
A defendant's general right to ask pointed questions during voir dire
to root out any bias highly relevant to the particularized facts of a case24 1
should include a specific right to ask pointed questions to detect the in-
ability to at least consider factors which may mitigate a sentence when
death may be imposed. For example, in the highly publicized "Chicago
7 '  case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions for violation of
the federal Anti-Riot Act,2 43 holding that the failure of the trial court to
make specific inquiry, upon request, into prospective jurors' attitudes
about the Vietnam War, the hippie counter-culture, and the Chicago po-
lice force deprived the defendants of a fair trial as guaranteed by the due
process clause.2' In so holding, the court "pointed out the inadequacy
of a general question in testing a juror's possible prejudice in a specific
area where it may well exist.""2 4 A general question was found to be
insufficient because the venire members may not be aware of their own
prejudices or able to recognize and disclose any bias which might affect
Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(d) (1973)); Missouri (Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 565.030.4(4) (1979)); Nevada (NEa. REv. STAT. § 175.554.2(c) (1986)); New Hampshire
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(IV) (1986)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2(B)
(1987)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1983)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4
(1988)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-206 (1978)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 2303(c) (Supp. 1988)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(c) (1983)); Washington
(WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (West Supp. 1988)); Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-
102(e) (1988)).
240. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15.
241. Ristaino v. Ross held that where special circumstances exist which prove a significant
likelihood of bias, the Constitution entitles the defendant to voir dire questioning about that
bias. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976). See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying
text. In holding that Ross was not entitled to voir dire inquiry on racial prejudice simply
because his trial involved an interracial crime, the Supreme Court noted that Ham had re-
quired such inquiry in part because racial considerations were integral to Ham's defense. Id.
Ham's defense was premised on the proposition that he was framed because he was a civil
rights worker. Id. Hence, the Court at least implied that the constitutional right to voir dire
inquiry as to specific biases are premised on the connection of those subjects to the trial of the
case.
242. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1973). In Dellinger, several leaders of the Youth International Party, an anti-war
counter-culture political party known as the "Yippies," were tried for rioting near the 1968
Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Id. at 348.
243. Id. at 409.
244. Id. at 368-70.
245. Id. at 369 (citing United States v. Robinson, 466 F.2d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1137, 1138 (7th Cir. 1972)).
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the trial of the case.2 46 This is particularly true when the venire is not
made aware of the critical issues involved in the trial.247 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that "it is essential to explore the backgrounds and
attitudes of the jurors to some extent in order to discover actual bias, or
cause."
248
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning was rooted in the defendants' rights
to exercise challenges for cause and to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges.2 49 The Tenth Circuit has similarly noted that in a case which
relied heavily on law enforcement officers' testimony, the failure of the
trial court to conduct voir dire inquiry on whether the jurors would give
undue weight to the testimony of police officers could constitute revers-
ible error.25°
Many courts require voir dire to question whether venire members
are able to follow the law and, more specifically, are able to follow spe-
cific legal principles likely to affect the trial of the case. For example, the
Sixth Circuit has held that the Constitution requires a trial court to in-
quire into the venire members' ability to accord the defendant the pre-
sumption of innocence and to hold the government to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, if such inquiry is requested by the defendant. 25 ' The
court's rationale for this constitutional requirement was the protection of
the defendant's right to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges.
252
The California Supreme Court has held "that a question about a
prospective juror's willingness to apply a specific doctrine of law if so
instructed should be permitted if the doctrine is likely to be applied at
trial. ' 253  Also, the Nevada Supreme Court has concluded that the
Witherspoon doctrine254 requires a trial court, upon request, to conduct
voir dire inquiry of prospective jurors' values and personal convictions in
capital cases. 255 The Nevada court reasoned that "[b]ecause a verdict of
guilty [in a capital case] leads to the ultimate question of whether the
accused should be executed, a decision of paramount importance to the
defendant, the personal beliefs and convictions of the members of the
246. Id. at 367.
247. Id.
248. Id. (citing Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 779 (3rd Cir. 1965)).
249. Id. at 367.
250. Id.
251. United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152, 153 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994
(1985).
252. Id. at 155.
253. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d. 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981).
254. See supra notes 102-13 and infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
255. Milligan v. State, 101 Nev. 627, 633, 708 P.2d 289, 293 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
870 (1986).
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jury are highly relevant.
256
As juror attitudes about police testimony must be explored on voir
dire when police testimony is central to the trial of a criminal case, juror
attitudes about mitigating factors should be explored on voir dire when
those factors may be central to whether a given individual lives or dies.
Thus, exploring a prospective jurors' ability to consider and give effect to
proffered mitigating evidence may be more essential than exploring their
ability to apply the presumption of innocence or to hold the government
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. THE PROSECUTION'S PEREMPTORY REMOVAL OF "DEATH
SCRUPLED," BUT ELIGIBLE JURORS
2 5 7
Witherspoon v. Illinois25' held that the state's removal of all who
expressed scruples against the death penalty and all who opposed it in
principle "crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable of
imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly will-
ing to condemn a man to die."' 259 Years later, the Court clarified the
Witherspoon rule to hold that a juror may be excluded for cause in a
capital case only if he harbors views about the death penalty that would
"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror
in accordance with his instructions and his oath.
260
Witherspoon and its progeny establish a limitation on the state's
power to exclude jurors in death penalty cases. This limitation prohibits
the state from entrusting the solemn duty of determining whether an in-
dividual should live or die to a jury deliberately organized to return a
death sentence. 26 The constitutional principle animating Witherspoon is
that the imposition of a death penalty by a jury engineered by the state to
be biased toward death cannot be squared with the fundamental constitu-
tional right to an impartial jury.
262
Prosecutors commonly sweep from the jury "all jurors who indi-
256. Id.
257. The authors wish to thank Professor Stanton D. Krauss for his thoughtful and
invaluable contributions to this section of the article.
258. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Witherspoon.
259. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520-21.
260. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,
45 (1979)). Jurors whose views about the death penalty would not compel their exclusion
under this test are commonly referred to as "death qualified" jurors. Id. at 440 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
261. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 666-77 (1987).
262. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523.
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cate[ ] the slightest uncertainty about the death penalty. ' 26 3 In Brown v.
Rice,2 4 for example, only nine potential jurors questioned by the state
during voir dire indicated any hesitation about imposing the death pen-
alty.265 Each was systematically removed by the prosecutor using per-
emptory challenges.266 Consequently, the district court held that the
prosecutor's deliberate tactic stacked the deck in favor of death and
failed to satisfy the sixth and fourteenth amendments' guarantee of an
impartial jury as construed in Witherspoon.267 In so holding, the court
found that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was not exempt
from judicial scrutiny under the sixth amendment's entitlement to an im-
partial jury,268 and that it was unconstitutional for him to use his per-
emptory challenges consistently to exclude potential jurors who harbored
reservations about the death penalty.269
While the district court in Brown v. Rice found that the peremptory
removal of death scrupled jurors violated the right to an impartial jury,
this question is by no means settled. At least two federal courts of ap-
peals have ruled that the prosecutor's removal of scrupled jurors did not
offend the Constitution.270 In addition, the North Carolina Supreme
Court took issue with the district court's opinion in Brown v. Rice and
ruled that no violation of a capital defendant's right to a fair and impar-
tial jury occurs when the prosecutor uses peremptory strikes to remove
jurors with reservations about the death penalty.271 Furthermore, while
this issue has engendered considerable debate, the United States Supreme
Court has never received briefs or heard arguments on the issue, nor has
263. Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 944 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari). See also Gray, 481 U.S. at 667.
264. 693 F. Supp. 381 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
265. Id. at 390.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 393.
268. Id. at 392.
269. Id. at 393. The court stated:
Witherspoon and its progeny are rooted in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
constitutional right to an impartial jury, a right which goes to the very integrity of
our criminal justice system. If we were to allow the state to achieve through its use
of peremptory challenges what for cause is clearly prohibited under Witherspoon and
its progeny, we would'be rendering the capital defendant's right to an impartial jury
meaningless, and sanctioning the abusive use of the peremptory challenge.
Id. at 394.
270. Sonnier v. Maggio, 720 F.2d 401, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1983); Antone v. Strickland, 706
F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1983). At the time these cases were decided, however, a prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges was considered sacrosanct and was virtually immune from
constitutional challenge. But see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965) (peremptory
challenge no longer immune from constitutional limits).
271. State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 381-83, 373 S.E.2d 518, 525-26 (1988).
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it ruled on the merits of the question.272 However, as argued below, the
policies and precedent underpinning the right to an impartial jury in the
special context of a capital sentencing proceeding demonstrate that
Brown v. Rice ruled correctly that the prosecutor's exclusion of all jurors
who were hesitant about applying the death penalty conflicts with the
sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to an impartial jury.27
A. Prosecutors Should Not Systematically Use Peremptory Challenges
to Overcome a Capital Defendant's Right
to an Impartial Jury
One of the primary rationales for according a right to a jury trial is
to provide "a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor." '274
That hedge is obliterated if the prosecutor is permitted to circumvent the
sixth amendment by peremptorily excluding all jurors less zealous in the
pursuit of the death penalty than the prosecutor, yet not excludable for
cause under the Witherspoon standard.2
The prosecutor in Brown v. Rice276 removed every juror who might
possibly be affected by imposing a death penalty.277 In essence, the pros-
ecutor struck from the jury everyone whose responses suggested to him
that deciding whether a human being should be put to death might cause
them to "invest their deliberations with greater seriousness and grav-
ity."278 Creating a hanging jury by systematically removing every poten-
tial juror who follows the oath and applies the law, but regards the duty
as a solemn one, is precisely the evil that Witherspoon and its progeny
forbid.
In her opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari in Brown v.
North Carolina,279 Justice O'Connor took the position that the limited
272. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940
(1986).
273. Rice, 693 F. Supp. at 392-93.
274. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
275. The Supreme Court has explained the State's limited power to exclude such jurors due
to their reservations about the death penalty:
[l]t is entirely possible that a person who has a "fixed opinion against" or who does
not "believe in" capital punishment might nevertheless be perfectly able as a juror to
abide by existing law-to follow conscientiously the instruction of a trial judge and
to consider fairly the imposition of the death sentence in a particular case.
Boulden v. Homan, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1969). See supra notes 102-13 and 258-62 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Witherspoon.
276. 693 F. Supp. 381 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
277. Id. at 390.
278. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49 (1980).
279. Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari).
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number of peremptory challenges granted to a prosecutor prevents the
prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to achieve the kind of jury
that Witherspoon condemned. 80 This position is inconsistent with the
real world of capital trials and ignored the facts of the Brown case.281
The prosecutor at David Brown's trial was allowed to exercise fourteen
peremptory challenges. 82 That number was more than ample to permit
the prosecutor to achieve exactly the end that Witherspoon and Witt held
unconstitutional-the systematic removal of everyone with reservations
about the death penalty. Indeed, the prosecutor was able to go quite a bit
farther with the peremptory challenges than was ever contemplated by
the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois,83 Adams v.
Texas,284 or Wainwright v. Witt.285 Essentially, the prosecutor removed
everyone who did not positively adhere to a lifelong enthusiasm for the
imposition of the death penalty.286
Given that public support for the death penalty has reached a new
high-according to a recent Gallup poll seventy-nine percent of the pub-
lic presently favor capital punishment 2 7-- it is difficult to imagine a case
in a state providing an ample number of peremptory challenges, in which
the prosecutor could not be able to achieve the same result at will.
Brown's prosecutor, for instance, needed only nine of his fourteen per-
emptory challenges to remove every juror who did not share his zeal for
capital punishment. 288 The shrinking number of people with reserva-
tions about the death penalty makes it easy for a prosecutor to use per-
emptory challenges to obtain the very kind of jury that Witherspoon
condemns.
Despite the ease of creating such a jury, the process clearly affronts
justice. One commentator notes:
[P]rosecutorial peremptory challenge practices result in juries
that do not reflect the conscience of the community; rather,
they reflect community sentiment purged of its reluctance to
impose a death sentence. The jury selection process that pro-
280. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
281. See Krauss, Death-Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt: The Issues in Gray v. Mis-
sissippi, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 507, 541 n.153 (1987).
282. North Carolina allows 14 peremptory challenges in this situation. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1217 (1986).
283. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
284. 448 U.S. 38 (1979).
285. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
286. Rice, 693 F. Supp. at 390.
287. Death Penalty Support Hits Record High, Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer, Decem-
ber 4, 1988, at 23A, col. 1.
288. Rice, 693 F. Supp. at 390.
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duces such a result runs a serious risk of imposing death
sentences that do not comport with society's aggregated under-
standing of justice.2 89
Moreover, if this common prosecutorial practice is constitutional,
Witherspoon is effectively overruled. The Court has consistently taken
the position that peremptory challenges are exclusively "a creature of
statute" and that "it is [therefore] for the State to determine the number
of peremptory challenges to be allowed and to define their purpose and
the manner of their exercise."2 90 The lack of constitutional limits on the
number of peremptory challenges allows a state to endow prosecutors
with thirty or fifty or one hundred peremptory challenges in capital
cases, thereby insuring that no venire member who expresses even the
slightest reservation about the death penalty could ever serve on a capi-
tal-sentencing jury. This result completely defeats the capital defendant's
right to an impartial jury as established in Witherspoon. A partial jury
created through the use of challenges called "peremptory" is no different
than one created through the use of challenges called "cause." The name
of the mechanism used is different, but in either event, the jury is equally
partial and equally violative of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
In his dissenting opinion in Gray v. Mississippi,291 Justice Scalia sug-
gested that a prosecutor's peremptory removal of jurors with reservations
about the death penalty is not within the ambit of the Witherspoon doc-
trine because the prosecutor's peremptory challenges can be offset by the
defendant's own peremptory challenges removing death penalty advo-
cates.2 92 However, a similar argument was made by the State of Texas in
Adams v. Texas293-an argument the Court rejected.294 In Adams, the
state suggested that the Texas statute at issue295 was neutral with respect
to the death penalty since the defendant was theoretically able to remove
anyone who unduly favored the death penalty. 296 The Court wrote:
[I]t is undeniable .. .that such jurors will be few indeed as
289. Winnick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical
Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1, 79 (1982).
290. Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2279 (1988).
291. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
292. Id. at 679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
294. Id. at 49.
295. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974). The statute provided that:
Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is
mandatory upon conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disquali-
fied from serving as juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of
death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
296. Adams, 448 U.S. at 49.
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compared with those excluded because of scruples against capi-
tal punishment. The appearance of neutrality created by the
theoretical availability of § 12.31(b) as a defense to challenge is
not sufficiently substantial to take the statute out of the ambit
of Witherspoon.297
The clear majority of death penalty proponents in the population298
renders ineffective the use of defense peremptory challenges to offset the
prosecution's peremptory challenges. In any event, the law has never
conditioned a defendant's right to an impartial jury upon his adroit use
of peremptory challenges. We know from Witherspoon and its progeny
that a judge's improper removal for cause of a juror is unconstitutional
despite the possession of peremptory challenges by the defendant. 299 The
same should be true for a peremptory removal of a juror.30° The ques-
tion, therefore, is not whether the defendant can use his peremptory chal-
lenges to remove jurors who stridently believe in the death penalty (a
limited ability given the popularity of capital punishment), but whether
the state has acted systematically to create a jury stacked toward impos-
ing a death sentence.
B. A Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges Should be Subject to
Constitutional Scrutiny
In considering the appropriateness of prohibiting the prosecutor
from using his peremptory challenges to circumvent a defendant's right
to an impartial jury, one should recall that the peremptory challenge his-
torically has been a device designed to protect defendants. 30 1 Blackstone
expressed the rationale for the challenges:
[I]n criminal cases, or at least ih capital ones, there is, in
favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capri-
cious species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without
showing any cause at all; which is called a peremptory chal-
lenge: a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to pris-
oners, for which our English laws are justly famous.30 2
297. Id.
298. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
299. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522; Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2051 (1987); Wain-
wright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985).
300. See, e.g., Brown v. Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381, 389 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude all jurors who expressed reservations about the death pen-
alty violated defendant's right to a fair trial).
301. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 242 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
302. Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 (ital-
ics added)).
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The protective function was especially important in capital cases.3°3 The
rule of in favorem vitae granted capital defendants the power to remove
jurors who seemed biased in favor of the government even though the
defendant was unable to articulate a legal cause for their exclusion.
Even though the purpose of the peremptory challenge was to insure
fairness to the defendant, as recognized in Brown v. Rice, peremptory
challenges are currently not constitutionally protected.3 °5 The Supreme
Court has sanctioned several restrictions on the ability of defendants to
exercise their peremptory challenges.30 6 As recently as June, 1988, while
discussing a requirement that defendants exercise their peremptory chal-
lenges to cure erroneous refusals of the trial court to remove jurors for
cause, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
We think there is nothing arbitrary or irrational about such a
requirement, which subordinates the absolute freedom to use a
peremptory challenge as one wishes to the goal of impaneling
an impartial jury. Indeed, the concept of a peremptory chal-
lenge as a totally freewheeling right unconstrained by any pro-
cedural requirement is difficult to imagine.30 7
Traditionally, under the rule set down by Swain v. Alabama,30 8 a
defendant had to prove systematic and consistent exclusion of potential
jurors on account of race to establish purposeful discrimination in a pros-
ecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges.30 9 While Swain did not im-
munize the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges from
constitutional scrutiny, in practice, the prosecutor was virtually uncon-
strained in excluding jurors who shared the defendant's race:
310
The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical
privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control ...
and the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from
jury service on account of race .... While the Constitution
does not confer a right to peremptory challenges, . . . those
challenges traditionally have been viewed as one means of as-
suring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury .... To
preserve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenge,
303. Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
304. 693 F. Supp. 381 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
305. Id. at 392-93. See also Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2278 (1988).
306. Swain, 380 U.S. at 243-44 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Pointer v. United
States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
307. Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2279.
308. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
309. Id. at 227.
310. Id. at 209.
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the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his actions in a partic-
ular case by relying on a presumption that he properly exer-
cised the State's challenges.311
The court has also sanctioned incursions on prosecutorial use of the
peremptory challenge. For example, in Batson v. Kentucky,31 2 the
Supreme Court curtailed prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges. 313
Justice Brennan reasoned that because the peremptory challenge is not a
constitutional right, the state's exercise of the challenge must be limited
to constitutionally permissible uses.314 Batson held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids a prosecutor from
peremptorily excluding prospective jurors who are members of the same
cognizable racial group as the defendant solely on account of their
race.
315
The Batson Court rejected the state's contentions that limiting the
use of peremptory challenges would "eviscerate the fair trial values"
served by the challenge and that "unfettered exercise of the challenge is
of vital importance to the criminal justice system. '316 While recognizing
that peremptory challenges occupy an important position in our trial
procedures, the Court ruled that the susceptibility of the challenge to
racially discriminatory abuse mandated the rule it announced.317
Justice O'Connor has noted that Batson reflects the Court's commit-
ment to fighting racial discrimination and that Batson cannot be applied
as a general prohibition against prosecutors' abuse of peremptory chal-
lenges to obtain unconstitutional ends.31 8 To the contrary, the rationale
of Batson and the Supreme Court opinions providing special protection
to defendants in capital-sentencing proceedings 31 9 compels the conclu-
311. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1987) (footnote and citations omitted).
312. 476 U.S. 79 (1987).
313. Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 944-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
314. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
315. Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
316. Id. at 98.
317. Id. at 98-99.
318. Brown, 479 U.S. at 941 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
319. The Supreme Court has long recognized that:
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-
year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the deter-
mination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens,
JJ.). This qualitative difference, the Court has held, requires "a correspondingly greater degree
of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination." California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-
99 (1983).
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sion that Witherspoon v. Illinois32 and its progeny forbid the state from
using its peremptory challenges to bar people "from jury service because
of their views about capital punishment on 'any broader basis' than in-
ability to follow the law or abide by their oaths."3 '
Turner v. Murray,322 a capital case involving the issue of jury selec-
tion, demonstrates that protection of a capital defendant's right to an
impartial jury is at least as significant as the racial discrimination the
Court sought to prevent in Batson. In Turner, the Court found that the
trial judge's failure to permit voir dire questioning of prospective jurors
about racial prejudice violated the defendant's right to an impartial
jury.323 The Court awarded Turner a new sentencing hearing even
though it affirmed his conviction.324 One scholar believes that the
Court's judgment in Turner should restrict the abuse of peremptory chal-
lenges in capital proceedings:
Of course, the Court does, in fact "pick and choose" among
constitutional rights, preferring some and disfavoring others.
But Turner v. Murray indicates that the pecking order may be
just the opposite of what Justice O'Connor has suggested [in
Brown v. North Carolina]. In Turner, a black man challenged
his murder conviction and death sentence on the ground that
the trial court denied his request to ask the prospective jurors at
voir dire whether the interracial nature of the crime with which
he was charged would affect their ability to decide the case "im-
partially." The Court decided that the risk of discrimination in
the determination of Turner's guilt did not require that the
judge accede to this request, but it ruled that his failure to do so
necessitated the vacation of Turner's death sentence. Inasmuch
as there is an undeniable risk that racial bias could have tainted
Turner's conviction, this ruling must reflect a judgment that
safeguarding the integrity of the capital sentencing process is
more important than protecting defendants against racially-
based discrimination.325
The decision to award a new sentencing hearing in Turner was pre-
mised largely on the broad discretion given the jury in a capital sentenc-
ing hearing and the "special seriousness of the risk of improper
320. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
321. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980). See also Krauss, supra note 281, at 541-44.
322. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
323. Id. at 36-37.
324. Id. at 37.
325. Krauss, supra note 281, at 541-42 (footnote omitted).
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sentencing in a capital case."' 326 The same considerations underpin the
Court's decisions in Witherspoon,327 Adams v. Texas,328 Wainwright v.
Witt,329 and, ipso facto, the District Court's decision in Brown v. Rice.330
In Lockhart v. McCree,331 the Court again expressed the fundamen-
tal importance of the right to an impartial jury in a capital sentencing
proceeding.332 In McCree, the Court rejected the argument that "death
qualification" created juries that were conviction prone and thus violated
the right to an impartial jury during the guilt phase of a capital trial.3 33
Writing for the Court, Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist distin-
guished the special concerns reflected in Witherspoon regarding capital
sentencing proceedings from McCree's claim of an unconstitutional con-
viction. "Witherspoon ... dealt with the special context of capital sen-
tencing, where the range of jury discretion necessarily gave rise to far
greater concern over the possible effects of an 'imbalanced' jury. ' 334 This
statement, one year after the decision in Wainwright v. Witt, character-
izes the Court's prohibition of the exclusion of sentencing jurors who
have reservations about capital punishment. Rehnquist's statement also
clearly reflects the Court's judgment that courts must take greater care to
guarantee the "impartiality" of capital sentencing juries as opposed to
juries employed to determine guilt or innocence, even of a capital offense.
The Supreme Court's cases regarding juror exclusion in death penalty
trials compel the conclusion that the Batson Court's prohibition against
the unconstitutional abuse of peremptory challenges also prohibits the
violation of a capital defendant's right to an impartial jury.
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of effective voir dire in empaneling an impartial sen-
tencing jury in capital cases cannot be overemphasized. Essential to ef-
fective voir dire in capital cases is an understanding of the sixth and
eighth amendment rights which may entitle a defendant to ask specific
voir dire questions.
Juror misconceptions regarding life sentences and parole eligibility
necessarily affect the sentencing recommendations. As a result, an eflec-
326. Turner, 476 U.S. at 37.
327. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
328. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
329. 469 U.S. 810 (1985).
330. 693 F. Supp. 381 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
331. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
332. Id. at 184.
333. Id. at 179-81.
334. Id. at 182.
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tive voir dire must seek to elicit those misconceptions from prospective
jurors. The "special circumstances" doctrine articulated in Turner v.
Murray335 provides a framework justifying a voir dire focusing on parole
eligibility. Furthermore, a capital defendant should be allowed to intro-
duce evidence regarding eligibility for parole, should a life sentence be
granted, in order to mitigate a potential death sentence.
The sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments allow a defendant to
use voir dire to discover jurors who have a bias against the consideration
of mitigating factors. Otherwise, the defendant loses the opportunity to
have the consideration of all reasons for imposing a sentence less than
death.
Finally, the exclusion of scrupled jurors creates a jury partial to im-
posing the death penalty. Therefore, preventing the prosecutor from re-
moving scrupled jurors through abuse of the peremptory challenge is a
critical imperative.
The constitutional guarantees of due process of law, a fair trial, and
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment arm the capital defendant
with tools for the jury selection process. Inquiries during voir dire of a
potential juror's misconceptions about parole eligibility, willingness to
consider various mitigating evidence, and attitudes about capital punish-
ment in general are prerequisites for the intelligent and effective use of
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. Through a rigorous and
thoughtful voir dire, the search for the somewhat elusive fair and impar-
tial capital sentencing jury can be conducted more successfully.
335. 478 U.S. 28 (1986).
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